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Abstract
In this paper, we provide another reason that may explain the adoption of the hub-and-spoke network
structure in the airline industry.  We show that when an airline has to decide on its capacity before the demand
conditions are perfectly known, a hub-and-spoke network structure by pooling passengers from several markets into
the same plane helps the firm to lower its cost of excess capacities in the case of low demand and to reduce its
opportunity cost of rationing in the case of high demand.
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The Role of Demand Uncertainty in Airline Network Structure
1.  Introduction
In the airline industry, one of the most striking changes precipitated by deregulation has
been the restructuring of carrier networks from a mostly linear to a hub-and-spoke (h&s) structure
(Levine 1987).
1  Economies of traffic have been identified as the major factor explaining this
change.  The usual argument is that an h&s network, through increased traffic density on the links
to the hub (the spokes), allows airlines to use larger, more efficient aircraft and to spread fixed
costs over more passengers.  It also allows better quality service through increasing flight
frequencies (see Bailey, Graham and Kaplan 1985, Caves, Christensen and Tretheway 1984,
Hendricks, Piccione and Tan 1995).  In this paper, we provide another reason for hubbing, that
has been surprisingly neglected in the literature, namely better allocation of capacity under
demand uncertainty.
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The main feature of our analysis is that an airline has to decide on its network structure,
including the level of capacities it offers, before the demand conditions are completely known.  In
this context we show that hubbing by pooling passengers from several markets into the same
plane allows the firm to adjust the allocation of capacity after the demand conditions are revealed.
This flexibility means that if the demand on one market turns out to be low, thereby creating
excess capacity, the firm can increase sales in other markets. Moreover, if the demand in one
market ends up being high with consequent binding capacity constraints, the opportunity cost of
rationing passengers is reduced by hubbing, since the firm can first ration the low valuation
travelers on several markets before rationing travelers with higher willingness to pay.
                                                
1 In a linear structure city-pairs are linked through direct service, while in an h&s network, cities are linked by direct
service only to a few central airports, the hubs.  Other city-pairs are linked indirectly, through the hubs.
2 Indeed, to our knowledge, the interaction between network structure and capacity allocation across markets has not
been formally examined.  This is all the more surprising since the main idea constitutes an application of the notion of
yield management.2
2. The Model
In this paper, we develop a stylized model of network structure choice that sets asides
many of the determinants of that choice that have been already studied in the literature in order to
focus the analysis on the effect of demand uncertainty.  Consider an airline, as in fig. 1, that
serves three markets AH, BH and AB.  We assume that only city H can be developed as a hub.
The airline decision is thus whether to adopt a linear network, in which case market AB is served
directly, or an h&s structure, in which case market AB is served indirectly through the hub H.  In
a linear network structure, the firm must decide on the level of capacity to offer on three links
AH, BH and AB while in an h&s structure, it must choose capacities on two links, AH and BH.
The airline network decisions (structure and capacity levels) are made in the context of uncertain
demand conditions.  The latter is resolved immediately after the network is determined and before
the firm decides its price.  This timing reflects that, contrary to pricing, altering a decision related
to network structure in the light of new demand information can be costly.  To simplify the




Figure 1. Network structure
We assume that the demand for air travel on the three markets is represented
by P Q r AH BH AB
r r r = - = a , , , (with  P
r , the price and Q
r , the total number of passengers on
route r).  We model the uncertainty about the demand conditions by assuming that a
AB  is a
random variable with distribution function given by FAB.  To keep the analysis tractable, we
assume that a
AB follows a uniform distribution on the support [0,1].  Furthermore, to reduce the
                                                
3 For instance, canceling a flight in case of low demand may have consequences on an airline's reputation.
Adjustments may be particularly difficult at slot-congested airports.3
number of sub-cases to be studied, we set a
r =1, for r AB „ which rules out demand uncertainty
on markets AH and BH.
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On the cost side, we assume a very simple structure that allows us to focus on demand
considerations in the choice of network structure. First, the per unit capacity cost (i.e. the cost of
offering one seat) is independent of the number of passengers carried on a route.  Second, this
cost is c on the links that include the hub (AH, BH) while it is 2c on the link AB (if it is served
directly).  The first assumption rules out traditional economies of traffic density, already studied
in the literature.  By imposing the same cost for carrying a passenger from A to B, whether
directly or through the hub, the second assumption eliminates some obvious cost considerations
on the choice of network structure.
Finally, we assume that if the airline chooses to serve AB directly, an overflow on that
market cannot be accommodated though the hub. While it may appear restrictive, this assumption
is close in spirit to Oum, Zhang and Zhang (1995) and therefore could be replaced by the
introduction of a fixed cost necessary to insure convenient traveling through the hub.
5  Note that
the main point of the paper, namely that demand uncertainty favors hubbing, is robust to the
elimination of this assumption, whose purpose is simply to highlight some of the mechanisms
that bring about this result.
6
                                                
4 We further assume that travelers are not allowed to do any arbitrage.  If a firm serves AB through its hub, two types
of arbitrage are possible: first, AB travelers could, if profitable, buy separate tickets for each sub-route.  That is buy a
ticket AH and BH to travel between A and B.  In our model however, given the demand structure, such an option is
never profitable at the profit maximizing prices. The second possibility of arbitrage is for consumers on the hub
markets to buy a ticket on AB and only use the portion corresponding to their actual journey.  Following Hendricks,
Piccione and Tan (1997), we exclude this option since the "carrier can stop this practice by requiring travelers to
board their outgoing and return flights at the city designated on the tickets.  This is indeed current practice among
airlines."
5 This cost may involve, for example, the development of an efficient system for transferring passengers and their
luggage or acquiring time slots that are compatible.  Introducing such a fixed cost C complicates the exposition of the
analysis, for one can always find sufficiently high values of  C that destroy the attractiveness of the h&s structure.
6 For a more detailed discussion of its role, see below.4
3. The Network Choice
  Before examining the airline network choice, let us introduce the notation used below:
hereafter, superscript I refers to the h&s structure (AB is served indirectly) while D refers to the
linear network structure (AB is served directly).  The subscripts AB refers to market between A
and B while we use H to refer to the two connections (and/or markets) to the hub (AH and BH).
Let us first examine the airline capacity decision if the airline decides to offer a direct
connection between A and B.  Since there is no demand uncertainty in the hub markets (a
H =1),
the monopolist chooses capacities just equal to the profit maximizing quantities (the usual
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2 1 .  For market AB, the demand is
uncertain.  The optimal capacity on that link is the solution to the following expected profit
maximization program:
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This function reflects the fact that, since capacities cannot be adjusted after the demand is
revealed, the firm's objective is to maximize its revenue subject to a capacity constraint.  If the
demand state is such that a
AB AB
D K £ 2 then the capacity constraint is not binding and the firm sells
its revenues maximizing quantity (i.e. Q
AB AB =
1
2a ).  If on the other hand, the demand state is
such that the capacity constraint is binding (a
AB AB
D K > 2 ) , the firm will sell all of its capacity
(Q K
AB AB
D = ).  It is easy to verify that the optimal K
AB





Note that market AB is only served if c £
1
4 .
If the firm adopts an h&s network serving AB through H, it has to choose its capacities on
links AH and BH, which will be used to serve both the hub and non-hub passengers.  Given the
symmetry of the two hub links (same demand and cost conditions), the capacities chosen on these
two links must be similar.  For a specific choice K
H
I  and after the demand condition on AB is5
revealed, the firm maximizes its revenues subject to potential capacity limits.  There are two
cases to be considered depending on whether K
H
I  is higher than 
1





2 : if the demand state is such that a
AB H
I K £ - 2 1, the monopolist's capacity
constraints are not binding and therefore it sells its revenue maximization quantities in all three
markets after the demand is revealed (i.e. Q
AB AB =
1
2 a and Q
H =
1
2 ).  If the demand state is such
that  a
AB H
I K ‡ - 2 1, then the firm is constrained by its capacities.  The capacity on each link
must be allocated between the hub and the non-hub markets.  The optimal allocation is such that
the marginal profit of selling one more seat in market AB is equal to its marginal cost.  This cost
is nothing more than the opportunity cost associated with having to ration one consumer in
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where the bar indicates that capacity constraints are binding.  The firm therefore maximizes the
following expected profit function:
E K d Q Q Q Q d c K
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which yields  K c
H
I* ( ) = -
1
2 2 6 . This solution is only valid for c˛[ , ] 0
1
6 since the objective









2 : in this case, the monopolist always sells its entire capacity on both links.
However, for low values of a
AB (i.e., a
AB H
I K £ - 2 4 ), it only serves the hub markets since the
marginal profit of selling to a first passenger in market AB is lower than the marginal opportunity
cost of this sale.  For  a
AB H
I K ‡ - 2 4 , the optimal allocation between the hub and non-hub6
markets is given by Q
AB and Q
Hin equation [2].  To determine what capacities to offer, the
monopolist maximizes the following objective function:
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which yieldsK c
H
I* ( ) = - -
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We can now compare the difference in maximun expected profits between the indirect and
direct network structures in order to determine the firm's optimal network choice.  Figure 2 shows
this difference to be positive for all relevant values of c, implying that the monopolist will always
adopt an h&s network structure.
7
The advantage of hubbing in the presence of demand uncertainty results from the fact that
by pooling consumers, the h&s structure offers the flexibility to adjust the allocation of capacity
across markets after the demand has been revealed. Such flexibility is not available to a firm that
chooses the direct network.  This advantage has various implications depending on the demand
state that can be best illustrated by examining the ex post difference in profit as a function of the
demand state a for a specific value of c.  Since our objective is to understand why any given
investment in capacity yields higher profits under the hub network, the profit differences between
the two structures are computed at capacities leading to the same total capacity costs.  Figure 3
reproduces the profit difference for c=0.1.  The ex post profits of the direct network have been




D * * , ) and those of the h&s network structure, by







* * , thereby ensuring similar total investment.
8  Four zones (Z) can be
distinguished in figure 3: in Z1 (a
AB £ 02674 . ), the demand conditions in market AB are such
                                                
7 Obviously, if there is a fixed cost associated with the development of the hub, the network structure choice will
depend upon the comparison between the amount of this fixed cost and the expected profit difference.
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* * 2 2 2 = + .This assumption helps to highlight the effects in favors of the h&s network
by eliminating ex post profit differences due to different capacity choices ex ante.  The actual difference in expected
profit is actually higher than what can be derived from Fig 3, since in the latter, the h&s monopolist has been
constrained to a non-optimal capacity level. Note, however, that if computed using ex ante optimal capacities for both
structures, profit differences could be negative for some demand states. This happens because, for some realizations
of a , the difference between the ex ante capacity choice and its ex post optimal level turns out to be lower for the
direct network.7
that capacity constraints do not matter in either network structures.  In this zone, the difference in
ex post profits is given by:








4 2 1 1 a a
AB AB c c - + - - +       [5]
While revenues from market AB are the same in both network structures (the first term is zero),
revenues from the hub markets are higher in the h&s structure (the second term is positive).  In
this case, the flexibility provided by hubbing allows the firm to use part of the excess capacities
created by a low demand in AB to increase sales in the hub markets.  In zone Z2
(02674 03674 . . < < a
AB ), capacity constraints are binding in the h&s network structure while they
are not in the linear network structure.  The ex post profit difference in this zone is given by:
 [( ) ] [( ) ( )( )] a a
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Revenues from market AB are higher under the D structure (the first term is negative). This
difference is, however, more than offset by the h&s's revenue advantage in the hub markets (the
second term), due to its flexibility in allocating capacities ex post.  The D network structure
induces an inefficient capacity allocation: there is excess capacity on AB whereas the marginal
revenue in the hub markets is positive.  This distortion, and thus the profit difference, declines
with a
AB.  In Z3 and Z4, capacity constraints are binding in both network structures.  The ex post
profit difference is then:
[( ) ( ) ] [( ) ( )( )] a a
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In Z3, a a
AB AB < =
* . 05675, the value of a  for which the ex ante capacity allocation of the D
structure turns out to be efficient ex post.  The distortion in capacity allocation is similar to that in
Z2: given its total capacity investment, the direct monopolist is selling too much in AB and not
enough in the hub markets.  As a
AB  approaches a
AB
* , the profit difference decreases since ex post
flexibility becomes less of an issue.  In Z4, a a
AB AB >
*  and flexibility in capacity allocation once
again becomes important.  Hubbing now allows the firm to reduce its opportunity cost of
rationing passengers: low valuation AH and BH consumers can be dropped in order to serve high
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valuation AB customers.  This option is not available to the firm serving AB directly since we
have ruled out for that firm the possibility of rerouting an overflow on AB through the hub.
Allowing for such rerouting would allow the two structures to perform equally in high demand
states (Z4).  However, it would not challenge the overall superiority of the h&s, due to its better
performance in low demand states. Furthermore, note that if one relaxes the assumption of no
demand uncertainty in markets AH and BH, the advantage of hubbing is likely to be enhanced,
since if demand in one of the hub market turns out to be high, the h&s monopolist is able to
ration AB passengers to increase sales in the high demand hub market.
9  In the case, even if we
allow rerouting in the direct network structure, an overflow on one of the hub markets, say AH
could only be accomadated through B.  While flying distances have not been explicitly modeled
in this paper, an A-B-H itinerary usually involves significant circuity and can be easily ruled out
under even mild assumptions about consumer preferences.
 It is finally worth noting that, in our setting, the h&s network is always superior to the
linear structure in terms of expected consumer surplus.  This is so even if the total investment in
capacity is larger in the linear structure than in the h&s configuration since the flexibility
provided by hubbing allows to serve more passengers with less capacity.
  Moreover, this
flexibility helps to avoid the rationing of high valuation travelers, thereby increasing consumer
surplus even further. For instance, when capacity cost is high (i.e., c>0.25) no AB passenger will
be served under the linear structure, while an h&s network will still allow some AB customers
with sufficiently high valuations to be served.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that hubbing provides airlines with increased flexibility in
adjusting their capacity allocation across markets as new information about demand conditions
becomes available.  This argument can easily be extended to encompass even anticipated demand
shifts, such as seasonal effects.  Hubbing, thus, may also reflect an effort to combine markets with
non-perfectly positively correlated anticipated demand variations.
                                                
9 Unless, of course, demands in the various markets are perfectly positively correlated.9
Assessing the importance of demand uncertainty in explaining the wide adoption of the
h&s network structure would require: i) evaluating the importance of demand uncertainty in
various markets, and ii) determining to what extend the random demand components are
correlated across markets.  Some preliminary discussions with airline officials seem to confirm
both the presence of a market-idiosyncratic uncertainty as well as the presence of medium run
inflexibility in re-affecting capacity across markets.  Of course the issue begs for a more rigorous
empirical analysis.
Finally, let us point out that the interaction between demand uncertainty and such factors
as cost considerations, consumers preferences and strategic interactions - all left aside in this
paper- may yield important new insights.  The analysis of these interactions features high in our
research agenda.
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Figure 2. Difference in the firm expected profit of the two network structures (I-D) as a function of c.
Network Structure Capacities Effects of Capacity Constraints




D * * . , . = = 045 01837 • Capacity constraint is binding for
a
AB > 03674 .
AB is served through the hub K
H
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a
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Figure 3. Difference in the firm ex post profit (I-D) as a function of aAB for c=0.1.